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I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

In 2014, the Idaho Legislature enacted the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act ("IRIA"
or the "Act"), which delegated authority to an Economic Advisory Council ("EAC") within the
Idaho Department of Commerce to grant tax subsidies to businesses that established an office in
Idaho and created at least 20 new jobs. Under the Act, the EAC is granted broad discretion to
grant or deny tax credits to businesses; the Act also strictly limits judicial review of agency
action.
In 2016, the EAC granted a tax credit worth $6.5 million to Paylocity, an Illinois
Corporation. Paylocity is a direct competitor of Appellant Employers Resource Management
Company, an Idaho Corporation ("Employers").

By providing a $6.5 million government

subsidy to Paylocity, the EAC will cover a substantial portion of Paylocity's overhead and
operating expenses, giving Paylocity a competitive advantage over Employers in attracting and
servicing Idaho business. To compete with Paylocity, Employers will have to match or beat the
fees Paylocity charges for its services, but without the benefit of a multi-million dollar
government subsidy.
The Idaho Constitution empowers the Legislature, and it alone, to create tax policy for
the state of Idaho and ensure the uniform application of Idaho's tax laws. The Legislature can
delegate the administration of tax laws to executive agencies. However, by authorizing the EAC
to waive taxes levied on selected companies, without strictly limiting the discretion that the EAC
exercises in selecting those companies, and by limiting judicial review of the EAC's decisions,
the Legislature has abdicated its legislative taxing power and delegated it to an administrative
body not elected by the people without adequate judicial review.
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A.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Employers filed this lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of the Act. This appeal is
taken from an order granting the Defendant/Appellee's motion for summary judgment.
Employers filed its Complaint on March 23, 2016. (Clerk's Record "R" p. 5). Defendant Megan
Ronk was the Director of the Idaho Department of Commerce ("Department") and was named in
her official capacity in the Complaint. Bobbie Jo Meuleman succeeded Ms. Ronk and is now the
named Defendant/Respondent. On May 4, 2016, the Department filed its Motion to Dismiss for
lack of standing. On May 20, 2016, Employers filed its Opposition to the Department's motion.
The Department's Reply Memorandum was filed on July 15, 2016. The district court set the
motion for hearing on July 20, 2016.-Employers filed a Motion for leave to file an Amended
Complaint on May 26, 2016.

At the hearing on July 20, 2016, the district court granted

Employer's Motion to file an Amended Complaint. On July 26, 2016, the Order granting leave
to file an amended complaint was entered by the court and Employer's Amended Complaint was
filed. (R p. 30). On August 1, 2016, the Department renewed its Motion to Dismiss and a
hearing was held on August 2, 2016.
At the conclusion of the hearing on the Department's Motion to Dismiss, the court took
the matter under advisement and rendered its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Standing on August 15, 2016. A judgment of dismissal was entered on
August 15, 2016.
Employers appealed from that judgment of dismissal and this Court accepted briefing
and conducted oral argument on August 16, 2017. (See Supreme Court Oral Argument number
44511). During the oral argument several Justices expressed concern regarding the limitation on

judicial review, but the Court limited its specific holding to the standing issue in its decision
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issued November 3, 2017. It concluded that Employers did have standing and noted that if
Employers received the relief sought, a finding that the IRIA is unconstitutional, "the
competitive advantage currently enjoyed by Paylocity will be eliminated and the parties will
compete on a level playing field." Employers Resource Management Company v. Ronk, 162
Idaho 774, 780, 405 P.3d 33, 39 (2017). The Court remanded the case to the district court.
The Department then filed its Answer to the Amended Complaint and Employers filed its
Motion for Summary Judgment on August 6, 2018. (Limited Clerk's Record ("LCR") pp. 8 and
14). The Department responded on September 19, 2018 and agreed that there were no genuine
issues of material fact and the issue was purely one of law. (LCR p. 53). The district court
conducted a hearing on October 3, 2018 and issued its Judgment and Memorandum Decision and
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment on January 3, 2019. (LCR pp. 86 and 99). Employers' Notice of Appeal
was timely filed on January 31, 2019. (LCR p. 101 ).

B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Article III, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides: "The legislative power of the state shall
be vested in a senate and house ofrepresentatives." Further, the Constitution provides that these
powers are not to be exercised by any other branch of Idaho State Government. Article II, § 1
states:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no
person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution expressly directed or permitted.
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The Idaho Constitution vests all taxing power in the Legislature. This plenary authority of
the Legislature is not delegable, and the Idaho Constitution forbids a delegation of unrestricted
and unguided taxing power.
The Legislature exercises its taxing power subject to

Article VII, §5 of the Idaho

Constitution, which states that "[ a]ll taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects [and]
the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from time to time as shall seem
necessary and just."
The Idaho Department of Commerce is an agency within the executive branch of Idaho
State Government. Pursuant to Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution, all agencies within the
executive branch are prohibited from exercising any of the powers reserved to the legislative or
the judicial branch of Idaho state government.
In 2014, the Idaho Legislature passed the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act ("IRIA"),
which was then amended in 2015. Idaho Code § § 67-4737 et seq. The IRIA authorizes tax
credits to be issued by the Director of the Department of Commerce to a qualified business
entity. To qualify for the tax credit, a business entity files an application with the Department of
Commerce. The application is reviewed by the Director to determine if all the information
required by the statute is present. The completed application is then reviewed by an Economic
Advisory Council ("EAC") within the Department of Commerce, whose members are appointed
by the Governor. The EAC is established under Idaho Code §67-4704.
The only requirement that the Legislature included in Idaho Code §67-4739 for a
business to obtain EAC approval of a tax credit application, apart from providing information to
the Director of the Department of Commerce, is the creation of "new jobs." In order to claim the
tax credit, an entity must create a minimum number of new jobs in the state of Idaho. "Minimum
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new jobs" is defined in Idaho Code §67-4738(11) as "not less than twenty (20) such jobs over
the term of the project if created within a rural community, or not less than fifty (50) such jobs
over the term of the project if created within an urban community."
Idaho Code §67-4739(1)(a) - (m) specifies information required to be provided as part
of the tax credit application process. However, in enacting this statute, the Idaho Legislature did
not establish standards, guidelines, or requirements as to how or whether this information is to be
used in the process of approving an application for issuance of a tax credit. Further, the statute
does not mandate that the EAC issue any required factual findings in support of the approval or
disapproval of an applicant's request for a tax credit. Without standards -- objective or even
subjective

-- in place, decisions of the EAC are, for all practical purposes, exempt from

meaningful substantive review by the judicial branch of Idaho state government.
Idaho Code §67-4739 gives the EAC discretion to grant or deny an application based on
its subjective determination of a business's qualifications. The only requirement that is even
potentially objective is the required number of "new jobs" that a business must create in order to
qualify for the tax credit. But even that requirement is subject to the Department's determination
that the jobs are in fact "new" and not simply renamed or artificially generated in some other
way. What is more to the point is that creating "new jobs" is not the sole or determining factor
for receipt of a tax credit. The EAC retains absolute discretion over other factors that are entirely
subjective. For example, Idaho Code §67-4739(1) requires an applicant to provide the following:
(a)
(c)
(f)
(k)

A complete description of the proposed project and the economic
benefit that will accrue to the state as a result of the project;
Proof of a community match;
Known or expected detriments to the state or existing industries in
the state;
A detailed description of the estimated new state tax revenues to be
generated by the project.
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While the Act specifies the categories of information that are to be provided, no
standards, guidelines, or rules are set out as to how the information is to be used or evaluated by
the EAC.

Its determination as to whether an applicant is entitled to a tax credit is totally

subjective and within the EAC's administrative discretion. It is therefore not subject to any
meaningful judicial review.
EAC's conclusion that an entity qualifies for a tax credit is at once arbitrary and
capricious, in that the EAC alone evaluates all of the information submitted, without any
required objective criteria for that evaluation, and without any required findings of fact to
support its decision. Thus, the EAC has virtually unlimited discretion to grant or deny any
business's application, regardless of the quality and content of the information submitted.
Idaho Code §§67-4704(1) and (2) limit the duty of the Director of the Department of
Commerce to determining whether the application is complete. If it is, the Director must submit
the application to the EAC, whose decision to grant or deny a tax credit is conclusive.
Although provision has been made for judicial review of a rejected application by the
aggrieved applicant, the law provides that a denial is not considered a "contested case," and the
law with regard to appeal of an administrative agency decision requires the court to defer to the
agency's exercise of discretionary authority. Therefore, as

a practical matter,

an aggrieved

applicant has no genuine judicial remedy for arbitrary agency action. In addition, there is no
avenue for a competitor to challenge an award to an applicant.
Employers is one of Idaho's top privately-held companies. The EAC granted one of
Employer's competitors, Paylocity, an Illinois company, a 28% credit against its future tax
liabilities in return for its promise to create "new jobs" in Boise. The estimated tax credit granted
to Paylocity by the EAC is approximately $6,500,000. (R p. 65).
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C.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Is the IRIA unconstitutional as it delegates judicial power to the EAC and

attempts to limit judicial review.
2. Is the IRIA unconstitutional as it grants the EAC legislative power to grant tax
subsidies.
3. Is Employers entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 12 - 117 as the Department has acted without a reasonable basis in law.

II. ARGUMENT

A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issues in this case are questions of law, and this Court exercises de novo review.
"Constitutional issues are purely questions of law .... " Meisner v. Potlatch Corp, 131
Idaho 258, 261, 954 P.2d 676, 679 (1998) (quoting Harris v. State Department of Health &
Welfare, 128, Idaho 295,297,847 P.2d 1156, 1158 (1992)).
We must deal with this question as strictly a judicial one, however
clear our convictions are that the purposes sought to be obtained
are praiseworthy and beneficial to the public. We cannot for that or
any other reason usurp authority which does not belong to us, and
by judicial construction make ineffectual a plain constitutional
provision, however long innocently violated. Where the
Constitution, being the supreme law of the state, forbids an act, no
legislative enactment can legalize it. And for this Court to do other
than to adhere strictly to the provision of the Constitution would be
an act of judicial lawlessness. Nor will the best and most patriotic
intentions make that law which contradicts the principles of the
Constitution or contravenes it justifiable.
Fluharty v. Board of County Commissioners, 29 Idaho 203,211, 158 P. 320,322 (1916).
Employers acknowledges that courts presume that legislative acts are constitutional and
that it must overcome a presumption of validity. State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 125,267 P.3d
709, 712 (201 l)(dealing with criminal statute). But a court has an obligation to consider the
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constitutionality of a statute and hold it to be unconstitutional if it violates the provisions of the
Constitution. "While such a legislative declaration is entitled to great weight, it is not conclusive.
There are limits beyond which the Legislature cannot go." State ex rel. Beck v. City of York, 164
Neb. 223, 82 NW.2d 269, 273 (quoted in Village of Movie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 82 Idaho
337, 348, 353 P.2d 767 (1960)). Employers submits that the IRIA is unconstitutional because it
violates the separation of powers mandated by Article II, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution. It
is fundamental that the Constitution prevails against conflicting statutory provisions. State v.
Johnson, 50 Idaho 363,296 P. 588 (1931). An unconstitutional act is not a law at all. Smith v.
Costello, 77 Idaho 205,290 P.2d 742 (1956).

B.

THE IRIA UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DELEGATES JUDICIAL POWER TO
THE EAC AND ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT THE COURTS' JUDICIAL REVIEW BY
ITS FAILURE TO SET STANDARDS OR GUIDELINES THAT LIMIT THE
EAC'S DISCRETION, THE ABSENCE OF A REQUIREMENT FOR FINDINGS
OF FACT, AND THE DECLARATION THAT DECISIONS ARE NOT TO BE
CONSIDERED "CONTESTED CASES."

One of the most fundamental principles of American constitutional law is that the branch
of government with authority to enact statutes is not the branch of government with authority to
render judgment on whether orders, statutes, rules and are constitutional, i.e., the branch that
exercises the legislative power cannot also exercise the judicial power.

Thus, the Idaho

Constitution distinguishes between the legislative power (lawmaking), which Article III, § 1
places in the Senate and House of Representatives and in the people themselves, and the judicial
power (entering orders and judgments declaring legal rights and obligations), which, with the
exception of trial of impeachments, Article V, § 2, it places in the Idaho Supreme Court, the
district courts, and other courts that have been established by the Legislature.
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Further, Article V, § 13, strongly protects the courts' exercise of the judicial power by
prohibiting the Legislature from encroaching upon it:
The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department
of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate
department of the government; but the legislature shall provide a proper
system of appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of
proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the
Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with
this Constitution ....
The IRIA violates this provision of the Idaho Constitution by making the EAC' s
decisions virtually non-reviewable. The Act's omissions and restrictions prevent any meaningful
judicial review and it is clear under multiple Idaho Supreme Court decisions that while
legislation may confer upon administrative agencies quasi-judicial powers, this delegation is
constitutional only when "such legislation does not attempt to give such finality to the
determinations made by the administrative agency thereunder that property and constitutional
rights of citizens may be conclusively determined without right to adequate judicial review."

State v. Concrete Processors, 85 Idaho 277, 282, 379 P.2d 89, 94 (1963). In Electors of Big
Butte Area v. State Bd of Education, 78 Idaho 602, 607, 308 P.2d 225, 230 (1957), the Court held
that to attach finality to the Board's proceedings would in essence constitute judicial action and
hence exercise of the powers of the judicial branch of government, prohibited by Article 2, § 1 of
the Constitution. That is the situation under the IRIA as well.
While the IRIA lists factors that must be discussed in each application, it does not set out
any standards or guidelines by which those factors must be evaluated. In that regard, this Court
described the Director's statutory function under the IRIA as follows:
The Director conducts a technical review and economic impact analysis of
each application. IDAPA 28.04.01.151.07. After the Director determines
that the application meets the requirements of IRIA, the application is
forwarded to the Economic Advisory Council (the "EAC"), a body created
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under authority of Idaho Code §67-4704 .... The EAC is given broad
discretion to approve or deny applications for the IRIA tax credit.

Emplrs Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Ronk, 162 Idaho 774,776,405 P.3d 33, 35 (2017).
Moreover, IDAPA 28.04.01.003 provides that there is no administrative appeal under
these rules, although nothing shall prohibit "an aggrieved applicant" from seeking judicial
review. This echoes LC. § 67-4739(2), which provides that the decision of the EAC shall not be
considered a contested case although an "aggrieved applicant" can seek judicial review. Thus
the statute attempts to insulate the decision of the Director/EAC from judicial review except for
aggrieved applicants contesting the rejection of their applications. No one else can ask the courts
to review the decision.
Even as to "aggrieved applicants," judicial review is illusory.

Since the EAC is not

required to make any findings of fact to support its decisions, a reviewing court would have no
evidentiary record to consider.

And since the EAC's consideration of an application is not

treated as a "contested proceeding," there is no evidentiary record or statutory requirement that
would provide a basis for meaningful substantive judicial review. The Idaho Administrative
Procedure Act, LC. §67-5279, provides:
(1)

The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

(2)

When the agency was not required by the provisions of this chapter or
by other provisions of law to base its action exclusively on a record, the
court shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the
action was:
(a)
(b)
( c)
(d)

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
made upon unlawful procedure; or
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
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The reviewing court must defer to the judgment of the EAC with respect to its
consideration of each application. Even if the court had the application before it, since the
Legislature did not include any statutory standards or guidelines as to the weight to be given to
each of the listed factors, no denial by the EAC could be considered "arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion."
In addition, without findings of fact issued by the EAC, a court could not know how the
EAC arrived at its decision, and would therefore be bound to uphold it in every case as it is not
considered a contested case pursuant to the AP A. Thus, real judicial review is illusory.
Contrary to the holding in Kerner v. Johnson, 99 Idaho 433, 583 P.2d 360 (1978), since
the EAC has no binding standards or guidelines it is required to follow, and it is not required to
make reviewable findings of fact to support its decision, its decision is not only conclusive
within the Commerce Department but is not judicially reviewable. The EAC's delegated power
therefore constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power in violation of the Idaho
Constitution.
There is no real judicial review of any decision of the EAC. The IDAP A regulations
provide there is no administrative appeal. The statute permits an "aggrieved applicant" to seek
judicial review, but this is an illusory provision because the statute provides that the decision of
the EAC shall not be considered a contested case. And since the EAC is not required to make
any findings of fact to support its decisions, a reviewing court would have no evidentiary record
to consider.
There is no avenue at all for a competitor to seek review of an approved application as
there would be no "aggrieved applicant." The Department made an argument to the district court
that there could be review of an approved application, even if there is no "aggrieved applicant,"
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based on this Court's decision in the previous appeal. The district court appeared to accept that
argument in its Memorandum Decision by noting that the Supreme Court granted standing to
Employers to challenge the constitutionality of the IRIA and therefore "in another case, an
injured competitor could challenge the specific credit granted to an applicant, upon proper
grounds." (Memorandum Decision and Order at 11, LCR p. 86.) Employers does not understand
this Court's previous opinion to add a provision for judicial review in the IRIA, but simply to
hold that a competitor such as Employers had the right to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute itself. The Supreme Court did not change the statute but merely allowed Employers to
challenge it.

C.

THE IRIA DOES NOT LIMIT THE EAC TO FINDING FACTS, BUT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY GRANTS THE EAC LEGISLATIVE POWER TO
GRANT TAX SUBSIDIES AND THEREFORE VIOLATES THE IDAHO
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF SEPARATION OF POWERS.
The delegation of discretionary authority to the Department of Commerce and the EAC

violates the Idaho Constitution's requirement of separation of powers. Article II, § 1, provides for
separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of Idaho's
government and provides that persons in one branch shall not exercise any authority belonging to
another.
The Idaho Constitution grants all legislative power to the Idaho House and Senate,
Article III, § 1. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the functions of the Legislature are to be
exercised by it alone. The Legislature has plenary authority in all matters of taxation except those
prohibited or limited by the Constitution. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, I 03
Idaho 808, 654 P .2d 901 (1982). Article VII, §5, states that "all taxes shall be uniform upon the
same class of subjects [but] the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from time
to time as shall seem necessary and just." (Emphasis added).
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The Idaho Constitution vests all taxing power in the Legislature. This plenary authority of
the Legislature is not delegable, and the Constitution forbids delegation of unrestricted and
unguided taxing power.

The Supreme Court has stated: "[W]e emphasize that certain

constitutional standards must be met in any delegation of legislative authority to a lesser entity of
government." Greater Boise Auditorium Dist. v. Royal Inn, 106 Idaho 884, 888, 684 P.2d 286,
290 (1984).
In order to apply for a tax credit under the IRIA, Idaho Code §67-4707 reqmres a
business to submit an application that includes information listed in § 67-4707(1). The Director
of the Department of Commerce "conducts a technical review and economic impact analysis of
each application." Emplrs Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Ronk, 162 Idaho 774, 775, 405 P.3d 33, 34 (2017).
After the Director determines that the IRIA requirements have been met, i.e., that all of the listed
information is included, she submits the application to the EAC, which thereafter has sole and
exclusive authority to grant or deny it.
The IRIA application requirements are nothing more than a listing of factors. Idaho Code
§67-4704 provides:
(1)

A business entity may claim a refundable tax credit for creating a minimum
number of new jobs in the state of Idaho. In order to be considered for
participation, an applicant or its designated representative must submit an
application to the director and shall include:
(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)

A complete description of the proposed project and the economic
benefit that will accrue to the state as a result of the project;
A description or explanation of whether the project will occur or
how it will be altered if the tax credit application is denied by the
council;
Proof of a community match;
A letter from the tax commission confirming that the applicant is
in good standing in the state of Idaho and is not in unresolved
arrears in the payment of any state tax or fee administered by the
tax commission;
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(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)

(k)

(1)

(m)

A detailed statement with an estimate of Idaho goods and services
to be consumed or
purchased by the applicant during the term;
Known or expected detriments to the state or existing industries in
the state;
An anticipated project inception date and proposed schedule of
progress;
Proposed performance requirements and measurements that must
be met prior to issuance of the tax credit;
A detailed description of the proposed capital investment;
A detailed description of jobs to be created, an approximation of
the number of such jobs to be created and the projected average
wage to be paid for such jobs;
A detailed description of the estimated new state tax revenues to be
generated by the project;
Identification of any individual or entity included within the
application that is entitled to a rebate pursuant to section 63-3641
or 63-4408, Idaho Code, or is required to obtain a separate seller's
permit pursuant to chapter 36, title 63, Idaho Code; and
The federal employer identification or social security number for
each individual or entity stated as the business entity in the
agreement.

(2)

Upon satisfaction by the director that all requirements are met pursuant to this
chapter, the director shall submit such application to the council [Economic
Advisory Council]. The council shall review the application, may request
additional information and shall approve or reject the application. An approval or
rejection from the council shall not be considered a contested case pursuant to
chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code; provided, however, that nothing in this section
shall prohibit an aggrieved applicant from seeking judicial review as provided in
chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.

(3)

If the council approves the application, the council shall instruct the director to
enter into an agreement with the applicant with the terms of the council's
approval. If the council rejects an application, the applicant may reapply with a
new application.

The Director's function appears to be limited to conducting a limited technical review of
the application in order to verify that the information described in items (a) through (m) is
included. Since the statute also requires that a business create a minimum number of new nonseasonal full-time jobs in order to qualify for tax relief, presumably the Director or the EAC
confirms that this information is also included in the application. The Director then submits the
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application to the EAC if it meets the "requirements" of the statute. The term "requirements" is
arguably vague. "Requirements" means either that the entire list of factors has been discussed in
the application, or that the factors have been evaluated substantively on their merits. Presumably,
the EAC is tasked with evaluating an application on its merits, which would limit the Director's
function to simply determining that the statutory list has been covered in the application.
It is at this point in the process that a question arises. If the Director has already
substantively evaluated the application on the merits, what need is there for further consideration
by the EAC? If, however, the Director has only evaluated the application's contents to verify
that all listed factors have been dealt with in it, then it makes sense that the EAC is conducting an
evaluation of the merits, but this is problematic given the absence of substantive guidelines or
standards.
Whether the Director conducts an examination of the merits of an application or just
verifies the contents of the application is entirely superfluous. Substantive and final evaluation of
each application is committed solely to the EAC, which makes the final and unreviewable
decision to grant or deny a tax subsidy to a business applicant. The language of the statute in
§67-4704(3) makes it clear that the EAC, not the Director, exercises ultimate and final authority
over that decision. It states:
If the council approves the application, the council shall instruct the director to enter
into an agreement with the applicant with the terms of the council's approval.

(Emphasis added.)
The application's discussion of the list of factors in §67-4704(1)(a)-(m), together with the
requirement that any business applying for a tax subsidy must agree to create a minimum number
of new non-seasonal full-time jobs, constitute the only requirements of the statute. There are no
standards or guidelines upon which to weigh the information provided, to grade an application
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based on each factor, or to determine whether an application meets the legislative intent of the
statute. The statute lists the factors to be considered by the EAC, but provides no guidance
whatsoever as to how those factors must be considered or applied. That is left entirely to the
unbridled discretion of the EAC. As stated above, Idaho case law makes clear that "certain
constitutional standards must be met in any delegation of legislative authority to a lesser entity of
government." Greater Boise Auditorium Dist. v. Royal Inn, 106 Idaho 884, 888, 684 P.2d 286,
290 (1984). See also Kerner v. Johnson, 99 Idaho 433, 583 P.2d 360 (1978); State v. Kellogg, 98
Idaho 541, 568 P.2d 514 (1977); Board of County Commissioners of Twin Falls County v. Idaho
Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588 (1976); Boise Redevelopment Agency v.
Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 499 P.2d 575 (1972); State v. Heitz, 72 Idaho 107, 238 P.2d 439
(1951 ). These standards have not been met in the IRIA and it is therefore unconstitutional.

D.

EMPLOYERS IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT.
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides that a court, including on appeal, shall award the

prevailing party reasonable attorneys' fees in a proceeding involving a state agency if the court
finds that the non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Employers
submits that the Department's defense of the constitutionality of the IRIA is without a reasonable
basis in law as it is clear that the statute violates the constitutional separation of powers and this
Court (or at least of several justices thereof) so suggested in the previous oral argument.
Accordingly, Employers requests an award of attorney's fees for bringing this action and appeal.
II.

CONCLUSION

Employers submits that the Legislature's delegation of unfettered discretion to the EAC
in the IRIA violates the Idaho Constitution's requirement of separation of powers both as it
attempts to restrict or eliminate judicial review or make such review illusory, and as it grants
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legislative power to the EAC to award tax subsidies. Employers requests this Court to declare
that the IRIA is unconstitutional and find that the EAC's decisions are void ab initio .

Respectfully submitted this

d '1.... ~

day of May, 2019.

EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED

By_ --t-_._=---_ _ ___;;__ __ __
Neil D. Mcfeeley, of the firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was
served upon the following attorney(s) this 29th day of May, 2019, as indicated below and addressed as
follows:

Steven Olsen, Division Chief
Scott Zanzig
Deputy Attorney General
Civil Litigation Division
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720
Attorneys for Defendant

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ x]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Fax
Electronic mail
' cott.zanzi g@.ag.idaho.go

ls/Neil D. Mcfeeley
Neil D. Mcfeeley
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